This paper provides cross-country empirical evidence on bond risk premia. I construct a panel of zero-coupon nominal government bond yields spanning ten industrialized countries and nearly two decades. I hence compute forward rates and then use two different methods to decompose these forward rates into expected future short-term interest rates and term premiums. The first method uses an affine term structure model with macroeconomic variables as unspanned risk factors; the second method uses surveys. I find that term premium estimates declined across countries over the sample period, especially in countries that appear to have reduced inflation uncertainty by making substantial changes in the monetary policy frameworks of their central banks. During the recent financial crisis, term premiums have remained flat and even declined further in some countries, perhaps reflecting the effects of quantitative easing actions by many central banks.
Introduction
Nominal yield curves nearly always slope up, implying that investors typically demand positive risk premia-or term premia-to induce them to hold long-term nominal bonds. Moreover the available evidence strongly suggests that these term premia vary over time. Time-variation in term premia complicates the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, as it clouds the relationship between the very short-term interest rates that are controlled by central banks and longer-term interest rates that are most relevant for the decisions of households and businesses.
It also makes it difficult to use the yield curve to measure expectations of future short-term interest rates.
Estimation of term premia is very important in macroeconomics, monetary economics and asset pricing, and enormous progress has been made on the topic over the last decade. Yet, nearly all of the existing literature on the estimation of term premia has used only data on a single country, most often the United States. Obtaining estimates of term premia for many countries is useful because it gives us more information about the macroeconomic and financial market determinants of bond risk premia.
However, to estimate term premia, we first need a dataset of zero-coupon yields. Accordingly, in this paper, I construct a panel dataset of nominal zero-coupon government bond yields at maturities out to ten years for ten different industrialized countries with separate monetary policies: the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, Germany, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand, going back to 1990, though the data start a bit later for the Scandinavian countries. Euro-zone countries other than Germany are omitted because their term structures have necessarily been highly correlated with those of Germany, at least since 1999 (although they diverged for a while in late 2008 and early 2009). Otherwise the dataset includes all significant industrialized economies, and is to my knowledge the first paper to fit zero-coupon yield curves to all of these countries.
1 I then use these data to decompose long-term forward rates into term premiums and expected future short-term interest rates. I find that term premia have declined globally over the sample period, with particularly sharp drops in some countries including Australia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. A possible interpretation of this is that it owes in part to declining inflation uncertainty amid substantial changes in the monetary policy frameworks of several central banks. During the recent financial crisis, term premium estimates have remained flat and declined even further in some countries, though not in
Germany. This may reflect "flight-to-quality" flows into government securities and/or the effects of purchase of long-term bonds by a number of central banks.
The plan for the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explains the construction of zero-coupon yields. Section 3 uses alternative methods to decompose these yields into term premium and expected future interest rate components. Section 4 discusses possible interpretations of the patterns in estimated term premia, with particular focus on inflation uncertainty. Section 5 concludes.
Zero-coupon yield curves
I obtained or constructed local currency zero-coupon government yield curves at the monthly (or higher) frequency from January 1990 to May 2009 for ten industrialized countries. The data in all cases refer to the yields on the last day of each month. Table 1 lists the available maturities, sources, and sample periods of these ten different yield curves. All yields in the dataset are continuously compounded and at maturities from 3 months to 10 years, in increments of 3 months. For some countries, the data begin a bit later than January 1990. For others, the data are available even further back, but I start the sample in 1990 as a trade-off between maximizing the sample size and minimizing the likelihood of a large structural break, and also because that lines up with the available data in the survey datasets that will be used later in this paper.
Distant-horizon forward rates are useful for measuring the determinants of the yield curve other than the direct effects of the current stance of monetary policy, because these forward rates represent the sum of long-run inflation expectations, the long-run expected real short-term interest rate and a forward term premium. Figure 1 shows the time series of nine-to-ten-year forward rates in all ten countries in the dataset. We can see a number of facts about these longterm forward rates:
(i) They have trended down in all countries since the early 1990s, and have also tended to converge. The range of forward rates in the early 1990s was around ten percentage points. In
May 2009, all forward rates were between 3½ and 7 percent, with the exception of Japan.
(ii) Distant-horizon forward rates are highly correlated across countries; for example the decline (v) In recent years, the nine-to-ten-year forward rates in the U.S. have been towards the top of the relatively narrow range across countries. In fact, in every month from 2002 to 2009, the nine-to-ten-year forward rate in the U.S. was uniformly higher than the corresponding forward rate in Germany, the U.K., Switzerland, Canada, Japan and Sweden. As a matter of accounting, this must represent higher inflation expectations in the U.S. than abroad, a higher expected real short-term interest rate (possibly reflecting faster expected productivity growth) or a higher term premium.
The secular international decline, and convergence, in forward rates (point (i) above) is consistent with a decline and convergence in long-run inflation expectations. However, the magnitude of the drop in forward rates seems too big to be due to a revision to inflation expectations alone, for this would mean that inflation expectations had fallen by 5 to 10 percentage points in many industrialized countries since the early 1990s. Some light can be shed on the plausibility of this by looking at survey evidence. Professional surveys have been found by Ang, Bekaert and Wei (2007) to provide excellent forecasts of inflation, at least in the U.S..
Consensus Forecasts provides a range of forecasts for all the countries in the panel, as listed in the data appendix. These include, at the semiannual frequency, long-horizon forecasts: forecasts of average inflation and growth from five to ten years after the survey date. Figures 2 and 3 show the long-horizon forecasts of inflation and GDP growth. The inflation forecasts did trend downwards, but only by about a couple of percentage points; far less than the fall in forward rates. Meanwhile, there is no evident global trend in long-term growth expectations. For Japan and Germany, long-term growth expectations deteriorated markedly, but for the U.S., they improved around the turn of the century and have remained close to 3 percent, despite falling off a little in the last few years. All in all, it seems hard to account for the magnitude of the decline in forward rates in terms of revisions to inflation (or growth) expectations alone. A declining term premium seems likely to also be part of the story. To shed some light on this and on the other empirical patterns seen in Figure 1 , I next turn to decomposing forward rates around the world into expectations of future short-term interest rates and term premia.
Term premium estimates

Estimates based on affine models
In this section, I use quarterly data (end-of-quarter) on yields from 1990Q1 to 2009Q1 2 . I decompose forward rates into average future expected three-month interest rates and the term premium by fitting an affine term structure model of the sort considered by Dai and Singleton (2002) and others to each country separately. Because the payoffs of bonds are deterministic, the absence of arbitrage implies restrictions on the time series and cross-maturity properties of bond yields. Affine term structure models exploit these restrictions.
Specifically, I consider a homoskedastic, discrete-time affine term structure model of the sort employed by Ang and Piazzesi (2003) and Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008) . Let ( ) n t P denote the price at time t of an n -period zero-coupon bond, let ( ) ( ) log( ) / n n t t y P n = − denote its yield and 1 t M + be the nominal pricing kernel. The price of the bond must be
Assume that the pricing kernel is conditionally lognormal
2 The analysis is conducted at a quarterly frequency because many of the macroeconomic series used below are available only at a quarterly frequency (e.g. New Zealand has no monthly inflation data). 
It then follows that
where n A is a scalar and n B is an m x1 vector that satisfy the recursions Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008) and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2002) and others have argued that there are indeed such factors in the term structure of interest rates.
An unspanned factor will help to forecast future interest rates, but it will not affect today's term structure and it will not be possible to recover it from observed yields. Macroeconomic variables, such as output growth or inflation, may be unspanned factors, as they are important for forecasting future interest rates, but evidently do not lie in the span of the term structure of interest rates as they are not needed to fit the cross-section of current yields. Also, a regression of current inflation or output growth onto interest rates yields a low or moderate R-squared.
Accordingly, following Joslin, Priebsch and Singleton (2009) , in this paper the state vector t X consists of the first three principal components of the zero-coupon yields from three months to ten years in that country, 3 plus the exponentially-weighted moving average of quarterly inflation and GDP growth, constructed as described in the data appendix. The macroeconomic variables are treated as unspanned factors, with the state vector under the Q measure consisting of yields alone.
My approach to estimation is similar to that of Cochrane and Piazzesi (2008 
TP
. Term premiums at other horizons can of course be computed in the same way. (7)). The typical fitting errors are small, at 2-8 basis points. This indicates that the first three principal components of domestic yields are together able to account for virtually all the cross-sectional variation in yields-no other factor is required for this purpose.
That in turn motivates including only yields in the state vector under the Q measure. Table 3 reports Wald statistics testing the hypothesis that lags of macroeconomic variables do not enter the equations for yields. The hypothesis is rejected for all ten countries, indicating that macroeconomic variables do help to predict future interest rates, and motivating the inclusion of these variables in the state vector under the P measure.
The full set of parameter estimates from fitting this affine model for the ten different countries are reported in an appendix of supplemental materials. Figure 4 shows the fitted five-to-ten-year forward term premiums. Like the distanthorizon forward rates in Figure 1 , these have generally tended to trend downwards over time, especially sharply so in the U.K., Sweden, Australia, New Zealand and the U.S.. The term premium estimates are typically, but not always, positive. In the last few years, the term premium estimates for all ten countries have mostly been in a range from -1 to +2 percentage points. On average over the last few years, term premium estimates were higher for the U.S. and
Germany than for most other countries, helping to explain the relatively high level of forward rates in the U.S.. Finally, even although forward rates generally rose during 2009 (Figure 1 ), the term premium component of forward rates was flat or fell in most countries. It declined in the U.K. and the U.S., although increased in Germany.
One can of course construct other affine term structure models, differing in the variables that are included in the state vector. Possibilities include yields only (omitting the macro variables-notwithstanding the evidence in Table 3 ), short-term interest rates and macroeconomic variables (following Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004)), principal components of both global and country-specific interest rates, and using the Nelson-Siegel level, slope and curvature factors are used as the state variables (as implemented by Christensen, Diebold and Rudebusch (2009)). Results for these four models are included in the appendix of supplemental materials. While the results clearly differ from model to model-and term premia are more countercyclical in some specifications than in others-the general patterns of term premia declining over time and being higher in the United States than abroad are remarkably common among the benchmark model and all four alternative specifications.
Survey-based term premium estimates
Any statistical models of the term premium are of course vulnerable to model misspecification and structural breaks. The affine term structure model in the previous subsection implies that yields at all maturities eventually revert to their long-run unconditional mean, so the possibility of a shift in long-run expectations of short-term nominal interest rates is ruled out by assumption, which is troubling since this was apparently a period of at least some decline in long-run inflation expectations. 4 Also, the models are estimated on the whole sample period, and do not take account of any learning (which is important as argued by Laubach, Tetlow and Williams (2007) and others).
Surveys provide an alternative, model-free, real-time, and arguably more robust way of decomposing yields into expected future short-term interest rates and term premiums. The idea is simple; if we can measure expectations of future three-month interest rates from surveys, then the term premium is just the difference between an actual yield or forward rate and the average expected future three-month interest rate over the corresponding horizon.
Consensus Forecasts provides long-horizon forecasts for all countries in the panel twice a year. Unfortunately, these long-horizon forecasts ask respondents to predict macroeconomic aggregates, including consumer inflation and real GDP growth, but not short-term interest rates.
Blue Chip is a separate survey that is very similar to Consensus Forecasts and many financial and economic forecasters contribute to both surveys. But, for the U.S. alone, twice a year, Blue
Chip provides forecasts of the average level of three-month interest rates from five to ten years hence, in addition to forecasts for consumer inflation and real GDP growth at the same horizon.
Let these be t r , t π and t y respectively and consider the regression Table   5 . I then used these coefficient estimates-imposing the Fisher hypothesis restriction-to obtain implied predictions from Consensus Forecasts of average three-month interest rates at the fiveto ten-year horizon for all the countries. That is, the term premium estimate is 5,10 0(
where 5,10 t f denotes the five-to-ten-year forward rate, and the coefficient estimates are obtained from the estimation of (8) using U.S. data. 5 The underlying assumption is that the relationship between equilibrium real short-term interest rates and growth is constant across countries.
The survey-based term premium estimates are shown in Figure 5 . Like the affine model term premium estimates, they show a tendency of trending down. They are typically positive, and, with the exception of Japan, never go very negative. Given how consistently nominal yield curves slope up, this seems to be a desirable property in a reasonable term premium estimate.
6
The survey-based term premium estimates declined especially sharply over the sample period in the U.K., Canada, Sweden and Australia. Thus both affine and survey-based term premium estimates fell sharply in the Australia, Sweden and the U.K.. The survey-based term premium estimates declined further at the end of the sample period in the U.S., the U.K., Canada and Norway. They nevertheless remained higher in the U.S. than in most other countries.
Discussion and Interpretation
Neither affine term structure models nor the survey-based estimates explain term premia in terms of fundamental preference parameters. However, having obtained cross-country evidence on term premia from these methods, the possible macroeconomic and financial market forces that may be driving bond risk premia can be discussed.
Bond Risk Premia and Inflation Uncertainty
Piazzesi and Schneider (2006), Campbell, Sunderam and Viceira (2007) and others argue that bond risk premia mainly reflect uncertainty about future inflation; inflation erodes the value of a nominal bond in precisely those states of the world in which investors' marginal utility is high.
Rudebusch and Swanson (2008) propose a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which the bond risk premium reflects technology shocks that cause inflation and consumption to be negatively correlated. In any of these models, reducing inflation uncertainty then ought to lower term premia.
I find several pieces of empirical evidence supporting this view. I first relate term premium estimates to two different measures of inflation uncertainty:
(i) A time series measure. Stock and Watson (2007) proposed an unobserved components model with stochastic volatility that appears to provide good forecasts for inflation. The model is a univariate specification that inflation is t t t π τ η = + where
log( ) log( ) I find this pattern as well, and find that it applies to several other countries. Germany and Japan, however, apparently did not have as much of a runup in the volatility of the permanent component of inflation. New Zealand is shown on a different scale as the peak in the volatility of the permanent component of inflation was much higher, and later (mid 1980s), than for the other industrialized countries.
(ii) Dispersion of survey forecasts. Consensus Forecasts reports the dispersion of its inflation forecasts (the standard deviation of individual forecasts) and this can be used as a proxy for uncertainty.
7 Figure 7 plots the twelve-month moving average of the dispersion of next-year inflation forecasts. Dispersion has trended down in most countries since the early 1990s, though rose again at the very end of the period. The countries with the largest declines in this measure of inflation uncertainty (up till the end of 2007) were the U.K., New Zealand and Australia.
Both measures of inflation uncertainty declined around the world in the 1990s, as did estimates of term premia. 8 And it seems noteworthy that the inflation uncertainty and term premium estimates declined substantially in those countries that adopted inflation targeting and/or made their central banks more independent and more transparent.
7 See Cukierman and Wachtel (1979) , Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) , Rich, Raymond and Butler (1992) and Rich and Tracy (2006). 8 Friedman (1977) , Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) and Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2003) all examine the relationship between the level of actual/expected inflation and uncertainty, and conclude that there is a strong positive relationship-low inflation tends to be stable inflation. This could arise because economies with high inflation tend to get rid of nominal rigidities and so shocks fall more heavily on prices than on the output gap. Empirically, this relationship seems to show up in the data used in this paper: the inflation risk measures all trended down during the 1990s in line with survey-based inflation expectations (Figure 2 ). The empirical relationship between inflation expectations and inflation uncertainty could mean that a decline in inflation expectations might be accompanied by a fall in inflation uncertainty and hence in term premia, leading to a larger decrease in forward rates.
To investigate the relationship between term premia and inflation uncertainty more formally, I ran panel data regressions of term premia on these two different inflation risk measures. County fixed effects were included, so as to allow for the possibility that some other country-specific factors that may affect term premia are also correlated with inflation risk measures. The regressions are of the form
where it TP denotes the term premium in country i in quarter t (with the term premium being either the affine model or survey-based estimate), it x is a vector of regressors , and i α denotes a country fixed-effect. The regressors are the two measures of inflation uncertainty, the dispersion of year-ahead Consensus forecasts of GDP growth (to control for real-side volatility which may be correlated with inflation volatility), and a recession dummy (using NBER business cycle dates for the U.S. and dates from the Economic Cycle Research Institute for the other countries).
Significance is tested by a bootstrap algorithm that allows the errors to be correlated across countries and over time. In each bootstrap sample, I resampled blocks of four quarters of data using the same four-quarter windows for each country in the panel, and then used these to construct bootstrap p values.
The results are shown in Table 5 for a number of regression specifications. Both measures of inflation uncertainty are consistently significant positively related to either term premium estimate. The coefficient on the dispersion of GDP growth forecasts is estimated to be positive, while the coefficient on the recession dummy is estimated to be negative, but these latter coefficients are significant only in some specifications. (i) The first is an "event study"-the market reaction to the announcement that the Bank of England was to be granted operational independence, on May 6 1997, that was also considered by Gürkaynak, Levin and Swanson (2006) . Figure 8 shows nominal and index-linked U.K.
forward curves at the daily frequency just before and after this announcement. The real yield curve was little changed, but the nominal curve declined and flattened, with the ten-year nominal forward rate dropping more than half a percentage point on a single day, presumably reflecting the effect of lower inflation expectations and a lower bond risk premium. Table 6 for all ten countries considered in this paper, over the sample periods 1981Q1-1994Q4 and 1995Q1-2009Q1 . Table 6 also shows the p-value from a test of the hypothesis that the covariance is equal over these two subsamples. In the early subsample, the covariances are all estimated to be negative. This means that inflation tended to erode the value of nominal bonds at times when consumption contracted, making these bonds risky assets, and in turn implying positive term premia, as in the explanation of Piazzesi and Schneider (2006) . In the later subsample, the estimated covariances are mostly positive and of smaller absolute magnitude. The difference across the two subsamples is statistically significant for three countries: Canada, the U.K. and the U.S., countries that all had sizeable declines in term premium estimates.
Bond Risk Premia and Market Segmentation
Inflation uncertainty has probably increased in the recent financial crisis. Although the time series measure of inflation uncertainty has changed little (Figure 6 ), the forward-looking surveybased measure has risen sharply ( Figure 7) . Nevertheless, term premium estimates remained flat and even declined further in some countries during late 2008 and early 2009. One possible explanation is "flight-to-quality" flows as investors increase their demand for the comparative liquidity of government bonds. A related possible explanation is that term premia were restrained by the effects of quantitative easing-purchases of government bonds and other longterm securities by central banks. Indeed, the term premium estimate rose sharply in the U.S. in mid-2008 before quantitative easing began. The ECB has been reluctant to pursue large scale asset purchases, and this could be part of the reason why German forward rates and term premia are especially high. Event-studies give more evidence for the role of quantitative easing in pushing term premia down. Figure 9 shows the U.K. and U.S. forward yield curves before and after the announcements of large-scale government bond purchases by the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve-both announcements took markets by surprise and were followed by sizeable declines in forward rates (more than half a percentage point at longer maturities). Such an explanation-in which the effective supply of bonds influences term premia-makes sense in a segmented markets environment, but not otherwise.
10 Greenwood and Vayanos (2008) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgenson (2008) are among the papers arguing that market segmentation is important in understanding bond prices.
Conclusions
There has been little empirical evidence comparing term premia in different countries.
Accordingly, in this paper, I have compiled a dataset of nominal sovereign yield curves spanning nearly two decades for ten industrialized countries, which are all the major industrialized countries that have separate monetary policies at present. I then use these to construct countryspecific time-varying term premium estimates.
10 Another puzzle perhaps pointing to market segmentation is the fact that term premium estimates in the U.K. have generally been negative for most of the last ten years. An often-quoted explanation for the low level of long-term yields in the U.K. is legislation in that country requiring pension funds to hold long-term bonds (Bank of England (1999)).
The evidence indicates that the term premium components of forward rates trended down in all countries over the last 20 years with some of the largest declines evident in Australia, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
In this paper, term premia are estimated from affine models (with yields and macroeconomic variables are factors) and surveys. Neither method explains risk premia in terms of fundamental preference parameters. However, the patterns in term premia across countries These findings have a number of substantive policy implications. In particular, they imply that measures to improve the credibility of the nominal anchor could lower longer-term interest rates and facilitate the transmissions mechanism of monetary policy. They also imply that if index-linked and nominal bond markets are equally liquid, the expected debt servicing costs to a government should be lower from issuing index-linked debt. And finally they suggest that in an economy which is stuck at the zero interest-rate bound, central bank purchases of government bonds can be expected to lower long-term interest rates.
Data Appendix
Besides the zero coupon yields, this paper also used data on CPI inflation, GDP growth and private consumption growth. These were obtained from OECD's Main Economic Indicators, at the quarterly frequency. For the purpose of fitting affine models, these were then smoothed by applying an exponential weighted moving average filter with a smoothing parameter of 0.75. No such smoothing was applied to the consumption growth and inflation used in section 4. For New Zealand, consumption and GDP data only go back to 1987Q2; all other series are available back to 1960Q1.
The paper also used survey data. The survey dataset consists of the Consensus Forecast predictions for consumer price inflation next year, from the survey taken each month from October 1989 to June 2009, inclusive. In addition to the point forecasts, the dispersion (standard deviation) of the forecasts is also included. The following countries are included in these surveys:
1. All months: U.S., Japan, Germany, U.K., Canada. 2. From January 1996 on: Sweden. 3. From June 1998 on: Switzerland and Norway. 4. From November 1989 on: Australia (December 1994 to September 1995 are missing). 5. From October 1995 on: New Zealand. Because the surveys are taken at the very start of each month, and the yield curve data refers to the last business day of the month, the timing convention that I adopt is to treat the survey for any given month as referring to beliefs at the end of the previous month. For example, the December 2008 observation is the survey dated January 2009.
In addition, each April and October, there is a "long-horizon" survey, asking respondents for their predictions of GDP growth and inflation from five to ten years hence. The dataset includes responses from each of these surveys from April 1990 to October 2007, inclusive. The following countries are included in these long-horizon surveys:
1. All surveys: U.S., Japan, Germany, U.K., Canada. (2007), using only dates when bonds in those countries existed at maturities out to ten years. The yield curves described in Gürkaynak, Sack and Wright and Anderson and Sleath (1999) , are available on the websites of the Federal Reserve and Bank of England, respectively, and are updated regularly. Those websites also include yield curves for index-linked government bonds. (7) ) for each country, in percentage points. Notes: The first column shows the results of regressing the Blue Chip semiannual forecast of U.S. three-month average interest rates from five to ten years hence on the forecasts of U.S. GDP growth and inflation from the same surveys. The regression uses surveys from March 1987 to April 2009, for a total of 45 observations. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The column on the right reports the results from the same regression, but imposing a unit coefficient on inflation (the Fisher hypothesis). (10) in which estimate sof the five-to-ten-year forward term premium are regressed on selected explanatory variables. The data are at the quarterly frequency over all ten countries in the sample using the time period from 1990Q1 to 2009Q1. The term premium estimates are from the affine model (top panel) and the survey method (bottom panel). The explanatory variables are the standard deviation of the permanent component of inflation in the UCSV model (PERM-UCSV), the dispersion of survey forecasts of inflation or GDP growth and/or recession dummies using NBER business cycle dates for the U.S. and ECRI dates for all other countries. Data sources are as listed in the data appendix. Fixed effects are included in all cases. Entries in parentheses are bootstrap p-values, using a block bootstrap in which each bootstrap sample consists of blocks of four quarters of data using the same fourquarter windows for each country in the panel. There are 1,000 replications in each application of the bootstrap. (11) and (12) is fitted by maximum-likelihood to quarterly consumption growth and inflation. Standard errors are based on the Hessian matrix. Data sources are as listed in the data appendix. Quarterly consumption data for New Zealand are available only back to 1987Q1, and no subsample results are shown for this country.
One, two and three asterisks denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. The column on the right reports the p-value in a test that the covariance of shocks is equal in the 1981-1994 and 1995-2009 subsamples. Notes: This chart shows the estimated nine-to-ten-year forward rates for the ten countries in the sample, with continuous compounding.
Figure 2: Long-Horizon Consensus Forecasts of Inflation
Notes: This chart plots the Consensus forecasts of average consumer price inflation from five to ten years hence against the survey date.
Figure 3: Long-Horizon Consensus Forecasts of International Growth
Notes: This chart plots the Consensus forecasts of average real GDP growth from five to ten years hence against the survey date.
Figure 4: Affine model five-to-ten-year forward Term Premium Estimates
Notes: This plots the term premium component of the five-to-ten-year forward rate, as estimated from the homoskedastic exponential affine term structure model described in the text.
Figure 5: Survey-Based Five-to-ten-year Forward Term Premium Estimates
Notes: This plots the term premium component of the five-to-ten-year forward rate, as estimated from surveys, as described in the text. 
Appendix of Supplementary Materials
Definitions of Alternative Affine Models
Model A1. This model has as the state vector the first three principal components of yields (for each country). This is the state vector under both P and Q measures. The state vector is observed, and estimation is by the method described in the text.
Model A2. Under the P measure, this model has the first three principal components of domestic yields and the first two principal components of yields in all countries as elements of the state vector. Under the Q measure, only the domestic yields are in the state vector. Thus the global factors are unspanned risk factors. The state vector is observed, and estimation is by the method described in the text.
Model A3. This model is similar to that estimated by Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004) . The elements of the state vector are short-term (three-month) interest rates, the exponentiallyweighted moving average of quarterly inflation and GDP growth, and year-ahead forecasts of inflation and GDP growth from Consensus forecasts. The state vector is observed, and estimation is by the method described in the text.
Model A4. This is the model of Christensen, Diebold and Rudebusch (2009) In implementing this, the 3-month, 5-year and 10-year yields are treated as observed without error; all other yields are treated as observed with i.i.d. measurement error.
Table App-2 reports the fit of these different models. Table App-3 reports the Wald statistics testing the hypothesis that lags of global factors do not enter the equations for domestic yields. Then the estimated five-to-ten-year forward term premiums for these four alternative models are shown on the subsequent four pages of this appendix. (7) ) for each country, in percentage points. 
